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The importance of the theory of instantaneous being for Buddhist thought 
cannot be overemphasized. In the words of Stcherbatsky:
A critical examination of the (supposed) stability of all existence 
contains... the final outcome of all Buddhist philosophy. Such is 
the leading idea of Buddhism—there is no other ultimate reality than 
separate, instantaneous bits of existence. Ultimate reality is instan­
taneous.* 1
* For the dispute as to whether the no-self theory extends to the transcendental self. 
Cf. “The Seer and the Seen” in The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, Volume V, No. I, May, 
1972, pp. 9-11,19.
1 F. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Lopct Volume I, unabridged from the Academy of 
Sciences of the U. S. S. R., Leningrad, circa 1930 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 
1962), p. 80.
I should like to call attention to the logical priority of the theory of instan­
taneous being for Buddhism through indicating that the concepts considered 
central to Buddhism are, one and all, either logically or epistemologically deri­
vable from the theory of instantaneous being. The core concepts of Buddhism 
may be taken to be the following: the theory of instantaneous being, the con­
cept of the no-self, the concept of dependent origination and the concept of 
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Nirvana.2 If we are able to demonstrate that all of the core concepts of Buddhism 
are logically or epistemologically derivable from the theory of instantaneous 
being, we shall have displayed the theory of instantaneous to be the Ur-concept 
of Buddhism.
2 That these concepts are the key concepts of Buddhism may be gathered from the 
fact that Buddhism is identified with these concepts: “Buddhism is called i) the no-Ego 
doctrine; 2) the doctrine of impermanence or of Instantaneous Being; 3) the doctrine 
of Dependent Origination...,” F. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Volume I, pp. 
115-125. Cf. also D. T. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (London: Luzac & Co., 
1907), P- r4°- Dr. Suzuki also includes the concepts of emptiness and of suchness. 
However, later (p. 173) he indicates that emptiness is, in reality, a special case of momen­
tariness (instantaneous being), and what he refers to as suchness may well be identified 
as Nirvana. It is interesting in this context to note Suzuki’s discussion of Nirvana when 
discussing suchness, pp. 100-108.
3 There are some subtleties involved here of which this account is a simplification; 
however, they do not affect the general point that is made. For example, only one version 
of dependent origination is derivable from instantaneous being. The concept of Nirvana 
is not, strictly speaking, a logical derivative, but rather an epistemological one. More 
on this later.
1 shall not argue that Buddhist philosophers do, in fact, generate the concepts 
of the no-soul, dependent origination of Nirvana from the theory of instantaneous 
being. Although a plausible case can be made for the genetic derivation of 
these concepts from the theory of instantaneous being, I do not intend in this 
compass to offer an historical account of the origin of these concepts. In fact, for 
our purposes it is not necessary to treat the historical evolution of these concepts 
as we are interested in the purely logical relationship that exists between these 
concepts. Therefore, I propose to elucidate how the concepts of the no-soul and 
of dependent origination are logically derivable from the theory of instantaneous 
being. My method for indicating the relationship of logical derivation among 
these concepts will be to display the theory of instantaneous being as compris­
ing a logical class of which the other concepts are sub-classes. If it can be 
demonstrated that the class constituted by instantaneous being has among its 
class members the concepts of the no-soul and dependent origination, then 
this will constitute a demonstration that the theory of instantaneous being is 
the Ur-concept of Buddhism.3
Before proceeding with the logical classification of these concepts, we 
shall, at first, provide an explanation of these concepts severally. There will 
necessarily be some overlap between these concepts; nonetheless, the distinc-
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tions proper to each demand a separate treatment of the concepts.
First, let us consider the theory of instantaneous being. The theory of instan­
taneous being is, simply put, the theory that all existence is transitory, evanes­
cent, ephemeral. The Buddhist would quote with great approval the famous 
fragment attributed by Plato to Herakleitos: “You cannot step twice into the 
same river.” For the Buddha is reported to have said:
... everything is a Becoming, a flux without (first cause) or end; 
there exists no static moment when this Becoming attains to being­
hood—no sooner can we conceive it by the attributes of name and 
form, than it has transmigrated or changed to something else. In place 
of an individual, there exists a succession of instants of consciousness. 
Strictly speaking, the duration of the life of a living being is exceed­
ingly brief, lasting only while a thought lasts.... As soon as that 
thought has ceased, the living being is said to have ceased.4
4 Ananda Coomaraswamy, Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism (New York: University 
Books, Inc., 1964), pp. 94-95.
5 Cf, Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Volume I, p. 102.
6 Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1967), p. 100.
In this account by Coomaraswamy, it is clear that there is no substantial 
existence either in the object or in the subject. When it is said that:... “every­
thing is a Becoming..there is no qualification of the class. It is clear that 
the concept of impermanence or of momentary existence applies to everything 
that there is.
What kinds of arguments may be offered on behalf of the concept of instan­
taneous existence? It seems as if the arguments for instantaneous existence fall 
mainly into the class of what we may call arguments from perception.5 6Perhaps 
the most famous example of the argument from perception is the example of 
the candle.
In looking at the candle, it may appear as if we are perceiving a static object. 
However, the Buddhists argue, on the contrary, that we experience a flux of 
distinct perceptions and never directly experience the candle itself as enduring 
through time. As Conze states in his Buddhist Thought in India:
Suppose I see a candle at II hours 35 minutes and 25 seconds. Then 
the concrete experience in which an extremely short-lived sight percep-
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tion was combined with an extremely short-lived object has vanished 
again by II hours 35 minutes and 26 seconds. If at 11 hours 35 minutes 
and 28 seconds, I attend to the same candle again, I may well recognize 
it as the same candle but dharmically speaking the object is different 
if only because the act of perceiving is a new one. There is a tendency to 
believe that, because the second object candle is very similar to the 
first one, a permanent, abiding, continuous thing has persisted from 
one exposure to the next. This thing is, however, merely inferred, and 
never actually given.
The archetypical example of substance in Western thought is the wax of 
Descartes, the material of a candle. What is reflective of substance for Descartes 
is reflective of no-substance for the Buddhist. It is interesting to note that the 
possible difference between the two traditions may stem from the fact that 
Buddhist is attending to the light.
The candle is, of course, meant to be illustrative of a general truth which 
applies to all of reality. The generalization of that which is true of candles to all 
of reality is explicit in the following argument by Professor Dasgupta:
Just as the flame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it 
seems to us as if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, 
so all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects around 
us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are being generat­
ed at every succeeding moment, but so long as the objects of the 
succeeding moments are similar to those of the preceding moments, it 
appears to us that things have remained the same and no destruction 
has taken place.7
7 Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume I (Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1922), p. 162.
8 F. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Volume I, p. 95.
All reality, then, is existent only for the moment.8 It is not at all surprising that 
Shakespeare and the Buddhists choose the candle as exemplifying the brevity of 
existence.
The chief arguments of the Buddhists for instantaneous being evolve from 
the data of perception. The general thematic content of the arguments seems 
to be that sensation reveals only a momentary existence of sensory data and the 
existence of an abiding object over and above the fleeting data of sensation is a 
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construct of the mind. A lucid example of the use of sensation as the source of 
the theory of instantaneous being is given by Stcherbatsky:
The present moment alone is seized by sensation. Since all external ob­
jects are reducible to sense-data, and the corresponding sensations are 
always confined to a single moment, it becomes clear that all objects, 
as far as they affect us, are momentary existences. The duration of the 
object beyond the moment of sensation cannot be warranted by sensa­
tion itself, it is an extension of that sensation, a construction of our 
imagination. The latter constructs the image of the object, when stimu­
lated by sensation, but sensation alone, pure sensation, points to an 
instantaneous object.9
9 Ibid., p. 87.
10 Cf George Berkeley, A Trtatiu Concerning the Principle! of Human Knowledge (New 
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957), pp. 15, 18; David Hume, A Treatite of Human Nature 
(Oxford: University Press, i960), Appendix; For Ayer’s position see pp. 11-12.
The reduction of the object to sense-data appears, in the case of the Buddhists, 
to be genuinely metaphysical (as in the case of Berkeley and Hume) and not 
merely epistemological (as in the case of Ayer).10 The consideration of whether 
or not such a metaphysical reduction is valid shall not occupy us here. Suffice it 
to say that the core argument of Buddhism for the theory of instantaneous being 
is the argument from perception.
What arguments may be brought to bear against the theory of instan­
taneous being is the argument from memory advanced by Sankara, Radha- 
krishnan, Sharma and others of the Vcdantist schools. We can remember, it 
would so appear, the previous moment. Even the evanescent light emitted by 
the ephemeral candle is surely remembered. If remembrance is not of the same 
object, very well. But how is it possible to remember similar states if there is 
not an enduring self or consciousness which remains the same throughout the 
successive states. The very possibility of memory seems to imply the substan­
tiality of self. If all existence is instantaneous, then self existence cannot endure 
through time. If there is no enduring self, then memory is an impossibility. But 
memory is possible. Therefore, there must be an enduring self and thus a flaw 
in the claim that all being is instantaneous. Consider the following two argu­
ments against instantaneous being, each one of which is based upon the pos­
sibility of memory. First, the argument by Sankara:
Those who, again assert that... all objects have only momentary 
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existence, maintain a view which is very far from reason. For a thing 
immediately after being pointed out as cIt is this* ceases to exist and 
consequently, no memory of the thing is possible.11
11 Sankara, Commentary on tbt Mandukyopanisad with Gaudapada’s Karika (Mysore: Sri 
Ramakrishna Ashrama, Sharada Press, 1968), IV, p. 22.
12 Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (New Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass Publishers, i960), p. 266. Cf S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Volume II 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1962), pp. 478, 480.
13 S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy^ Volume I, p. 162.
Chandradhar Sharma argues the following:
The fact of memory and recognition gives a death-blow to the theory 
of momentariness. The past is recognized and remembered in the 
present and this implies the existence of a permanent synthesizing 
subject without whom knowledge shall always remain an impossi­
bility. Identity cannot mean similarity. Even similarity requires a 
permanent subject who knows two things to be similar. When the 
Buddhist himself recognizes all these successive cognitions, till he 
breathes his last, as belonging to the same Self, should he not tremble 
in maintaining shamelessly the doctrine of momentariness.12
The Buddhist reply to this objection is, naturally enough, that it presupposes 
the validity of memory. How is the validity of memory to be established? If 
one attends carefully to one’s memory experience, all that one can verify as 
genuinely experienceable is the present memory image. To say that this image is 
an image of the past is to take for granted the validity of memory'. If memory is 
a relation of the present to the past, and one of the terms of the relationship, 
the past, is not accessible; how then may the validity of the relationship be 
essayed? The validity of memory must be proved if we are to accept an argu­
ment which bases its claim upon the evidence offered by memory. If the evidence 
is spurious, then the argument which it supports loses its force. Consider the 
reply to the objection based on memory proposed by Dasgupta:
When I say this is that book, I perceive the book with my eye at the 
present moment, but that “this book” is the same as “that book” 
(i.e., the book arising in memory), cannot be perceived by the senses.13
In strict* sensu, we cannot accept the evidence from memory because all that 
we possess at any given moment is the present sensory image. The image docs 
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not come before us with a label attached to it verifying that it is an image from 
the past. That it is an image from the past is not a datum. We infer that the pre­
sent image refers to the past; however, there is no empirical basis for this in­
ference.
At this point, we should turn our attention to the most important consequence 
of the theory of instantaneous being: the no-self theory of Buddhism. In our 
exposition of the theory of instantaneous being we have largely confined our 
attention to the object. If all being is instantaneous, however, instantaneousness 
must apply to the subject as well. Therefore, it should not be difficult to see 
how it is that the no-self theory of Buddhism is, in fact, a logical derivative of 
the theory of instantaneous being.
The no-self theory' of Buddhism is, simply put, that there is no continuous 
personality or empirical ego. There is an interesting question as to whether 
there is a transcendental ego in addition to the empirical ego. The crux of the 
dispute between Buddhism and Vedanta is whether the no-self theory rules out 
a transcendental as well as an empirical ego.14
14 Suzuki Daisetz, "What is Shin Buddhism” in The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, Volume 
V, No. 2, October, 1972, p. 2.
15 Suzuki Daisetz, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism, p. 143.
However, the self which is germane for our purposes is the empirical ego and, 
consequently, the existence or the non-existence of the transcendental ego we 
shall regard as immaterial. What we shall concern ourselves with is the posi­
tion of the Buddhists regarding the empirical ego. There is an abundance of evi­
dence which can attest to the no-self theory of Buddhism. In his classic, Outlines 
of Mahayana Buddhism, Suzuki Daisetz states:
... there is no atman or ego-soul behind our mental activities and 
no-thing in itself... so to speak, behind each particular form of 
existence. This is called the Buddhist theory of no-atman or non-ego.15
The arguments the Buddhist uses to disprove the existence of the self fall 
roughly into two types. I say roughly because there is a certain degree of over­
lapping between the two kinds of arguments, despite the differences in kind. 
The first of these types we may label the argument from introspection; the second 
of these types we may label the argument from the analysis into component 
parts. Dasgupta summarizes the argument from introspection as follows:
... Buddhism denied the existence of... permanent selves. What 
appears as self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tenden- 
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des manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these 
dissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones appear 
and so on ... Apart from the emotions, ideas and active tendendes, 
we cannot discover any separate self or soul.16
16 Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume I, p. 161.
17 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section vi.
18 A. J. Ayer, Language, Trurb and Logic (New York: Dover Press, 1946), pp. 126-7. 
There is a further distinction between the Humian analysis and the Buddhist analysis 
in terms of purpose. This distinction will become more clear later.
The argument from introspection bears a striking resemblance to the argument 
for the non-existence of the self offered by Hume. As Hume states:
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 
myself at any time without a perception ... I may venture to affirm of 
the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection 
of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable 
rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.17
It would appear from this passage that Hume is firmly in the camp with the 
Buddhists, stating a definitive, metaphysical claim as to the non-existence of 
the self. Also, in passing, we may distinguish the Buddhistic and the Humian 
view of the no-self from the strictly epistemological viewpoint of A. J. Ayer. 
As Ayer states:
... we do not hold, as he (Hume) apparently did, that the self is an ag­
gregate of sense experiences, or that the sense-experiences which 
constitute a particular self are in any sense parts of it. What we hold 
is that the self is reducible to sense-experiences, in the sense that to say 
anything about the self is always to say something about sense ex­
perience.18
The other main type of argument offered by the Buddhists for the non-existence 
of the self is the argument from the analysis into component parts. Here, rather 
than searching for the self through introspection, the technique is to analyze 
the self into its component parts. As each component part will, in itself, tend 
not to remain the same, there can be nothing left over and above the com­
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ponent parts which could be said to have a lasting duration through time. If 
we examine Suzuki’s argument for the non-existence of the self, we discover a 
variation of the argument for the non-self from the analysis into component 
parts:
They (the Buddhists) point to a wheel or a house and state that when 
a wheel or house is dissected into its component parts, there is no 
wheel, no house whatever. An object is divisible into infinitely small 
parts, and nobody can discover anything in them which can be called 
its substance, corresponding to the name the object bears. All things 
of whatever form are composites; they are analyzable and finally reduc­
ible to nothingness. This applies to all objects, mental as well as phys­
ical. Hence the Buddhist doctrine of non-ego... ,19
19 Suzuki Daisetz, “The Seer and the Seen,” p. 19. Stcherbatsky would dispute with 
Suzuki that the argument from the analysis into component parts is the means through 
which Buddhism arrives at the no-self. His argument, as that of Dasgupta’s, is that the 
no-sclf is reached through observation of experience. Cf. Buddhist Logic, Volume I, p. 102.
20 S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Volume II, pp. 480.
An objection to the non-self theory of Buddhism immediately arises. Surely 
there is a unity in what we see and this is, at least, in part due to the unifying 
act of the subject who holds different objects together, compares them and 
relates them. When one hears a song, one does not hear all of the notes at once. 
One must hold the notes together in order to appreciate the song as a whole. 
This holds true of any sentence. If one did not perform protentive and retentive 
unifications, experience would be pure chaos.20
Although the above objection initially appears quite compelling, it is for all 
that, a petitio. For, from the perspective of the Buddhist theory of instantaneous 
being, it is already questionable that wc perceive permanences or unities. If 
we assume unities and permanences in the object, we shall, of course, need a 
unifying and a unified subject as well. However, according to the theory of 
instantaneous being, all that exists is the present moment. All else is a construc­
tion of the mind. That unities and relative permanences appear is unquestionable. 
What is questionable is their ontological status. No one doubts the appearances 
of mirages or hallucinations, but one may fairly question their ontological 
status.
Whether or not one sides with the Buddhists on the issue of the no-self, it is 
at least clear that the no-self theory of Buddhism is a special case or a sub-class 
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of the Buddhist theory of instantaneous being. For, if all being is instantaneous, 
it follows that the being of the ego is instantaneous. If the being of the ego is 
instantaneous, then it follows that there is no continuous personality or self. 
If the theory of instantaneous being is true, then the no-self theory of Buddhism 
follows as a logical consequence; for, if the members of a class (in this case the 
class of instantaneous beings) include a class of no-selves, then if the class of 
instantaneous beings exists, then the class of no-selves exists necessarily. The 
reverse, however, is not the case. For, the Buddhist theory of the no-self could 
be true for Buddhism and the theory of instantaneous being would be false. 
Although this is contrary to fact (for Buddhism), it is not logically impossible. 
It is logically impossible, however, for the theory of instantaneous to be true and 
the no-self theory of Buddhism to be false. It follows, therefore, that the no-self 
theoryr of Buddhism is logically derivable from the Buddhist theory of instan­
taneous being.
We may now examine the Buddhist concept of dependent origination in order 
to display it to be a logical derivative from the Buddhist theory' of instantaneous 
being. In doing so, however, we shall have to distinguish between what we shall 
term a strong and a weak version of the theory of dependent origination. I 
shall argue that the strong version of dependent origination contradicts the 
theory of instantaneous being. It is only the weak version of dependent origina­
tion that we may say derives from the theory of instantaneous being.
The concept of dependent origination is one of the more obscure concepts 
in Buddhist thought as exemplified by the cryptic definitions of it found in the 
literature.
For example, in Professor Dasgupta’s formulation:... “one change is 
determined by another and this determination is nothing more than “that hap­
pening, this happened.”21 It would appear from this rendition that the theory 
of dependent origination meant that something could come to be only after 
the coming to be of a preceding event. In other words, the concept of dependent 
origination would be equivalent to the concept of a temporal succession.
21 S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume I, p. 165.
22 E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 94.
A somewhat more lucid formulation of dependent origination is found in the 
account Conze reports the Buddha to have given:
CI will teach you the Dhamma,’ says Gautama. ‘That being present, 
this becomes; from the arising of that, this arises. That being absent, 
this does not become; from the cessation of that, this ceases.”22
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What is being said, apparently, is that the only form of dependence of each 
moment upon each other moment is that one moment can only arise upon the 
arising of another moment and cease upon the ceasing of another moment.23 
We shall term this description of the theory of dependent origination the strong 
version.
23 This version corresponds closely with at least part of meaning which Kant assigns 
to the category of causality in The Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp 
Smith (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1965), p. 243: “When therefore, I perceive that 
something happens, this representation first of all contains (the consciousness) that there 
is something preceding, because only by reference to what precedes docs the appearance 
acquire its time relation...”.
24 Vide Robert E. Allinson, Five Dialogues on Knowledge and Reality (Washington, D. C.: 
Library of Congress, 1972), pp. 85-94 for an extended discussion of the non-temporality 
of the moment.
25 Sankara, Commentary on the Mandukyofanisad with Gaudapada3! Karika, IV, p. 31.
This strong version of the Buddhist theory of dependent origination is, I 
shall argue, incompatible with the theory of instantaneous being. For, in an 
instant there is no time.24 Time is only possible if there is a series of moments 
such that one can identify one moment as earlier and another moment as later. 
If we regard the past as earlier and the future as later, then and only then may 
we locate the present in the temporal series. However, according to the theory 
of instantaneous being, there is no past and no future. All that there is is the 
present. But, if all that there is is the present, then we cannot locate the present 
in the temporal series.25 If we cannot locate the present in the temporal series, 
we cannot say that it comes before “z” or after “x”. However, according to the 
strong version of dependent origination, one can determine which moments 
precede and which moments follow. Consequently, the strong version of de­
pendent origination is incompatible with the theory of instantaneous being.
We may now consider what we have chosen to name the weak version of the 
Buddhist theory of dependent origination. According to the weak version, there 
is no causal connection between moments. The weak version differs from the 
strong only in not making any positive claim. It only states the absence of a 
causal relationship; it does not state the presence of any kind of relationship, 
even the relationship of mere succession.
If we assume the weak version of dependent origination, we may safely derive 
the theory of dependent origination from the theory of instantaneous being. 
For, it plainly follows from the theory that all existence is instantaneous, that 
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there is no causal connection between one moment and any other moment. In 
the timeless instant, there is no time for the action of causality. In order for there 
to be a causal connection between one moment and any other moment, the two 
moments would have to coexist, in which case, there would be neither instan­
taneous being nor causality.
Why do we say that two moments must co-exist in order for there to be a 
causal connection? Why can we not say, with Stcherbatsky, that one moment 
simply arises from a previous moment.26 Let us examine the possibility of one 
moment arising from a previous moment. Must the entire previous moment 
elapse before the next moment can arise? If this be so, there can be no connection 
between the two moments and, a fortiori^ no causal connection. If the two 
moments must exist at the same time, then the first moment cannot be said to 
produce the second moment or the second moment arise from the previous mo­
ment. For as Sankara states:
26 Vide F. Th. Stcherbatsky, The Centra! Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the 
Ward “Dharma” (Calcutta: Susil Gupta Publishers, 1956), pp. 7, 53.
27 Sankara, Commentary on the Mandukyopanisad with Gaudapada’s Karika, IV, p. 16.
For the following reason ..., the order of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ must 
be shown. For, if cause and effect arise simultaneously, then they cannot 
be related as the cause and effect, as it is impossible to establish the 
causal relationship between the two horns of a cow produced simul­
taneously.27
If we say that the first moment, ‘a’, need not complete itself, but the second 
moment, ‘b’, may commence in the last stages of the first moment ‘a’, then we 
must examine carefully what is meant by the concept of the last stages. If we 
label the last stages of the first moment ‘z’, then what part of z must elapse before 
the new moment b can arise? Z cannot completely elapse for this is contrary to 
hypothesis. Suppose then, that z need only complete part of itself, x. . . y 
in order for moment b to arise. If this is true, however, then moment b will 
exist simultaneously with moment a, as during z, moment a has not elapsed. If 
the two moments exist coincidentally with each other, we cannot say either 
that a is the cause of b or even that b can arise only after the succession of a.
That there is no causal connection between moments may be seen as a logical 
consequence of the theory of instantaneous being. For, if the theory of instan­
taneous being is correct, it follows as a logical consequence of that theory that 
there can be no causal connection between moments. If, however, there is no 
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causal connection between moments, it is not logically necessary that all being 
be instantaneous. It could be true that all being were continuous. Thus, if we 
assume the weak version of the concept of dependent origination, which simply 
states the absence of causal connection, dependent origination is a logical 
derivative of instantaneous being. If we assume the strong version of dependent 
origination, that one moment can arise only after another moment has arisen, 
this version is then seen as logically contradictory with the theory of instan­
taneous being.
Thus, we have displayed the concept of no-self and the concept of dependent 
origination as logical derivations of the theory of instantaneous being. In order 
to complete the task we set out to accomplish, we have only to demonstrate that 
the concept of Nirvana may be derived from the theory of instantaneous being. 
In so doing, I do not propose to demonstrate that the concept of Nirvana is 
logically deducible from the concept of instantaneous being, but rather that it 
is epistemologically prior and metaphysically identical with it. The seeming 
paradox of this last statement is obviated by distinguishing between the order 
of knowledge and the order of being. In the order of knowledge, the concept of 
Nirvana is a logical consequence from the concept of instantaneous being; in 
the order of reality, it is identical with it.
I should like to demonstrate that the concept of Nirvana is the recognition of 
the truth of the concept of instantaneous being. We recall that from the theory 
of instantaneous being we were able to derive the concept of the no-self. This 
particular derivation is of utmost importance. For Buddhism is ultimately a 
practical system, that is to say, theory exists for the sake of practice.28 The goal, 
if we may speak in these terms, of Buddhism, is a state of freedom from bondage. 
The state of freedom from bondage is what is referred to as Nirvana. Nirvana, 
then, is the ultimate end of Buddhist thought. All bondage exists from the point 
of view of the ego. When the ego or self concept is dissipated, then and only then, 
is Nirvana possible. Consequently, the dissolution of the ego concept is of crucial 
importance. For, if there is no self, then who may be said to be in bondage?
28 Suzuki Daisetz, Essays in Ztn Buddhism, First Series, p. 237.
The realization of the no-self is the state of Nirvana. From the order of knowl­
edge, however, the realization of the no-I precedes Nirvana. As Suzuki states:
“Because I think ‘I am’ there are things called ‘mine’. But as there is no 
‘I am’ where shall we look for things ‘mine’? By thus reflecting we enter 
the Dharma of Nonduality.” Some replied, “Samsara and Nirvana are 
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two. But when we understand the ultimate nature of Samsara, 
Samsara vanishes from our consciousness, and there is neither bondage 
or release, neither birth or death .. .”29
29 Suzuki Daisetz, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism, p. 106.
30 Suzuki Daisetz, Essays in Zen Buddhism, p. 364.
31 Alan W. Watts, The Way of Zen (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 146.
32 Suzuki Daisetz, Manual of Zen Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, 1960), p- 94-
Of course, the realization of the no-I is not solely a matter of logical deduc­
tion. The realization of the no-I must be experienced and not simply cognized 
intellectually. The numerous stories of sages and their seemingly unusual 
techniques of enlightenment are, one and all, attempts to shock the aspirant 
into a sudden state of realization of the no-I. It is particularly important for our 
purposes to notice the suddenness of the enlightenment technique for it is 
supportive of the claim that the no-I (and, hence, Nirvana as the experiential 
aspect of the no-I) is logically derivable from the theory of instantaneous being.
Classic examples of the sudden enlightenment technique are prominent in 
the school of Zen. According to Suzuki:
Technically speaking, Zen belongs to the group of Buddhist doctrines 
known as... ‘abrupt* (tun in Chinese), in opposition to ‘continuous*... 
(chien); and naturally the opening of the mind, according to Zen, 
comes upon one as a matter of... sudden happening .. .30
The literature abounds in examples of sudden awakenings. For example, a 
disciple comes to a Zen master with questions regarding how to achieve enlight­
enment. The master evades his questions. As the disciple turns to depart, 
the master calls his name. The disciple turns. “Yes,5* he says. “There it is,’* 
answers the master.31
The consequence of this sudden enlightenment is Nirvana:
But ever since my realization of No-birth, which quite abruptly 
came on me,
Vicissitudes of fate, good and bad, have lost their power over me.32
In this latter account of enlightenment, the connection between the realiza­
tion of the no-I, the suddenness of this realization, and the consequent liberation 
from the bondage of the world are clearly indicated.
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Nirvana is, in reality, only another word for instantaneous being. For it is 
only in the realization that all that exists is the present moment that one realizes 
that there is no “I”. To live in the present moment is to live in Nirvana.33 45 Nir­
vana is not some separate and mystical state which one achieves after throwing 
ofT the shackles of earthly existence; rather, Nirvana is living in the present or 
the omnipresent moment of existence.54
33 Alan Watts, The Way of Zen, p. 124.
34 Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume I, p. 142.
35 Suzuki Daisetz, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism, p. 354.
36 Heinrich Dumoulin, A History of Zen Buddhism, translated from the German by Paul 
Peachey (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963), p. no.
37 Suzuki Daisetz, Zen and Japanese Buddhism (Tokyo: Dai Nippon, 1967), pp. 68-69.
We are now prepared to understand the astonishing statement that “Samsara 
is in no way to be distinguished from Nirvana: Nirvana is in no way to be dis­
tinguished from Samsara.”55 What this means is that, from the standpoint of 
instantaneous being, there is no becoming. Therefore, there is no coming into 
existence, no going out of existence. Consequently, there is nothing to be 
regretted and nothing about which to be fearful. It is in this sense that a Zen 
scholar, Heinrich Dumoulin, states:
Enlightenment now equals ‘every day’ and the ‘every day’ equals 
enlightenment. Thus, it becomes useless to distinguish between the 
before and the after. Reality is one single now. Now is every day.36 37
And, as Suzuki expresses in his marvelous statement:
Zen knows no time and therefore there is to Zen no beginning of the 
world, no ending of the world. This very moment you are talking to 
me is the end of the world and at the same time the beginning of the 
world. When rhe present moment is grasped everything will be all 
clear to you.
“How then do we grasp the Eternal Now?” you may ask.
“Listen! Don’t you hear an airplane whirling over our heads?”57
Understanding what it means to say that Samsara is Nirvana, what does it 
mean to say that Nirvana is Samsara. Attachment to Nirvana is really a form 
of Samsara, of being subject to the past and the future. For, if one strives to 
achieve Nirvana, he will be in the position of worrying if he will achieve it or if 
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he has achieved it or if he can hold onto it if he does achieve it. As it is said: 
“If a man seeks the Buddha, that man loses the Buddha.”38
38 Lin-chi quoted in The Way of Zen* p. 125.
Thus, to conclude. Instantaneous being is the Ur-concept of Buddhism. For, 
from instantaneous being, we can derive the concepts of the no-self, and, at least 
in one form, that of dependent origination. Of these two derivations, the first 
is the more important, for the realization of the no-self is the means by which 
Nirvana is attained. The realization of Nirvana is not the attainment of some 
spectral, other-worldly state, but is rather the ability to truly live in the world. 
In this sense, Samsara is Nirvana. If one lives in the present, one can actualize 
the truth of the theory of instantaneous being. This would be good Oriental 
philosophy as the ultimate truth of Oriental philosophy is the truth of Realiza­
tion.
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